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 PROMOTING IMPARTIALITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS THROUGH CHINESE 
CRIMINAL LAW: ARBITRATION BY “PERVERSION OF LAW” 
 
 





This essay is prompted by a recent Chinese criminal provision 
governing the impartiality of arbitration. The goal of the essay is to 
critically examine the new law and to put forward some proposals for 
reform, which could be employed to resolve the tension that exists 
between arbitrator impartiality and deference to arbitration. Although the 
new provision appears to be a rule to eliminate the abuse of arbitral 
power, it may raise more questions than it resolves. This essay explores 
the problems and undertakes a comparative analysis of the U.S. provision 
as well as an analysis of some cultural and traditional elements 
influencing the new crime in China. From the author’s point of view, the 
concerns could be better met by fine-tuning the rule rather than 
abandoning it in order to keep a balance between the previous two 
conflicting values. A mechanism of judicial interpretation, borrowing 
some U.S. experience, has been proposed. It could well suit China’s 
needs because the benefits of arbitration can be retained without 
sacrificing the impartiality of arbitration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
December 2001 and the growing globalization of the world economy has 
greatly increased international trade and investment. In the wake of the 
modern explosion of international trade and transnational investment, 
arbitration has become “the accepted method for resolving international 
business disputes.”1  
Parties from different nations tend to seek arbitration in order to 
prevent an abundance of jurisdictional problems.2 Arbitration has also 
become a preferred method for foreign parties to resolve their legal 
disputes in China, largely due to the distrust these parties have of 
Chinese courts.3 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a1 Professor of Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law (China). 
aa1Law lecturer, Southwest University (China); PhD candidate, Southwest University of Political 
Science and Law (China). 
1 YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6 (1996). 
2 Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational 
Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the PRC, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 333 (1997). 
3  See Deborah Chow, Development of China's Legal System Will Strengthen Its Mediation 
Programs, 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFL. RESOL. 4 (2002). 
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With its acceptance and popularization, international commercial 
arbitration now plays a very important role in private conflicts 
settlement. Arbitration provides a neutral venue that aims at ensuring 
procedural fairness for both parties, unlike litigation in the national 
courts of one of the parties to a dispute.4 Arbitration permits parties from 
two different countries to exercise a great deal of control over how a 
dispute will be resolved.5 The parties are free to tailor the proceedings to 
meet their needs. Specifically, parties can contract to govern all disputes 
by a certain set of laws or procedures. 6  They decide the scope and 
content of the arbitration, define its procedures, and choose the location 
of the arbitration by specifying these stipulations in the arbitration 
agreement. 7  Most importantly, parties have the power to select the 
decision maker.8 This freedom to select the arbitrator is why arbitration 
has been described as “hiring your own private judge.” 9  Arbitration 
allows parties to not only realize procedural fairness, but also benefit 
from the predictability to their disputes, lower attorney fees, more 
privacy, and expert decision making. The finality of arbitration is another 
advantage, which is often attractive for its speed and cost-effectiveness. 
Particularly, with well-functioning international enforcement system 
under the 1958 New York Convention,10 arbitral awards are often easier 
to enforce than court judgments.11 The issue of arbitrator impartiality is, 
therefore, critical to the development of arbitration rules and cannot be 
ignored in the process of international private disputes resolution. The 
legitimacy of international commercial arbitration relies, to a large 
degree, upon the thoroughness of arbitration institutions and the 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators.  
While Chinese arbitration has seen remarkable progress in a 
relatively short period, there are many problems remaining that need to 
be addressed. The focus of this essay is criminal liability for biased 
arbitrators. This essay is largely prompted by the codification of a new 
crime: Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” (Wangfa Zhongcai Zui), 
which has been provided in the Amendments to the Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (VI)12 in 2006 and designed to punish biased 
arbitrators for their wrongdoings. The goal of this essay is to critically 
examine the legal regime of arbitrator impartiality in China, including 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974). 
5 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 1, at 273. 
6 See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518. 
7  See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5 (2d ed. 1991). 
8 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §3.2 (1st ed. 1995). 
9 MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1:01 at 1 (3d ed. 2001). 
10 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].  
11 See Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing Countries: A Proposal, 39 
VA. J. INT'L L. 607, 632 (1999). 
12 The Amendments to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (VI) (Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa Xiuzhengan) (liu) was promulgated and effective on Jun. 29, 2006. For 
a relatively detailed description of the provision, see infra Part Ϫ. 
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this provision, and put forward some proposals for reform. Part II 
provides a brief description of the framework of arbitration system in 
China. Part III presents a background of Arbitration by “Perversion of 
Law,” and examines the debate on the new law, compares it with some 
provisions of the U.S. arbitration laws, and explores the relative Chinese 
legal culture, tradition, and economic environment factors that underlie 
criminal liability of arbitrators. Part IV gives evaluations from the 
perspective of jurisprudence and offers some reform proposals on the 
basis of borrowing some U.S. experience. Finally, Part V provides a 
summary, along with some concluding remarks. 
II. ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN CHINA 
Arbitration in China was traditionally divided into two types: 
domestic arbitration and foreign-related arbitration. The latter was also 
called international arbitration, which was designed to handle disputes 
arising from economic, trading, transportation, and maritime activities 
involving a foreign element.13 In contrast, the former is labeled as having 
jurisdiction over cases without foreign elements. Obviously, Chinese law 
treated foreign-related and domestic arbitration separately. 
Accordingly, domestic Arbitration Commissions in different regions 
are established mainly for resolving domestic economic contract 
disputes. As a matter of fact, there are --in theory-- at least several 
arbitration mechanisms for domestic disputes. For instance, employment 
disputes, intellectual right disputes, and securities disputes are not 
arbitrated pursuant to voluntary agreement, but submitted to arbitration 
because of particular laws. These do not fall within the scope of our 
present discussion, since they are not commercial in nature and those 
tribunals are more like administrative organs. This essay will primarily 
focus on international commercial arbitration. The institutions for 
handling international cases include China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) and China Maritime 
Arbitration Commission (“CMAC”).14 The arbitration rules and practices 
of CMAC are virtually identical to those of CIETAC, so foreign-related 
arbitration can best be demonstrated by CIETAC. In accordance with its 
rules, disputes arising between Chinese parties and/or parties from Hong 
Kong, Macao or Taiwan, or between Chinese-foreign joint ventures and 
Chinese parties, are within CIETAC’s jurisdiction.15 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13 See 1995 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 65. [hereinafter Arbitration 
Law]. 
14 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission was first set up in 1954 by 
the name of Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, and China Maritime Arbitration 
Commission in 1958 by the name of Maritime Arbitration Commission. Both are within China 
Council for Promotion of International Trade. Arbitration Law sets forth a special chapter dealing 
with their legal status in China's dispute resolution system. The history of CIETAC and their 
arbitration rules are available online at http://www.cietac.org (last visited March 12, 2012). 
15 See CIETAC Arbitration Rules, art. 3. 
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CIETAC’s long-standing exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related 
disputes, however, was dramatically by State Council Notice,16 Article 3, 
which provided that domestic Arbitration Commissions now had the 
“power to accept foreign-related arbitrations when the parties have 
agreed to submit disputes to such Arbitration Commissions.” 17 
Additionally, according to the newly revised 2005 CIETAC Arbitration 
Rules, CIETAC can also accept cases involving domestic disputes.18 This 
allows cross pollinizing between foreign-related arbitration matters with 
domestic Arbitration Commissions and domestic disputes with CIETAC. 
Indeed, the ambiguity of these provisions appears to be the source of 
conflicts.  
Another notable distinction between domestic and foreign-related 
arbitration is the different criterion of judicial review over arbitral 
awards. The People’s Courts can review not only procedural issues but 
also the legal reasoning supporting the domestic arbitral awards.19 As for 
international arbitration, however, the courts are not allowed to consider 
the legal merits to overturn an award. These courts can only scrutinize 
the procedural issues,20 which is also in conformity with the New York 
Convention. Similar provisions can be found in the Convention, of which 
China became a member in 1987.21 The procedural review is certainly a 
remarkable achievement, given the short history of the development of 
China’s arbitration. 
Generally speaking㸪 China’s international arbitral tribunals are 
better established and more sophisticated, and it is important that they 
remain distinct from domestic arbitral tribunals, which do not share 
CIETAC’s reputation.22 Empirical research has revealed that CIETAC 
holds a leading position in terms of the caseload in China. In 2010, 
CIETAC accepted 1,352 new cases in total, including 418 foreign-related 
cases, accounting for 30.9㸣 of the total caseload.23  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
16 The full name of the State Council Notice is “Circular of the General Office of the State 
Council Regarding Several Issues Which Need to be Clarified in Relation to the Implementation of 
the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China,” June 8, 1996. 
17 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 346.  
18 CIETAC Rules, supra note 15, at art. 3.  
19 If a party can prove that evidence on the basis of which the award was made had been forged, 
or the other party withheld evidence sufficient enough to have an impact on the impartiality of 
arbitration, he may submit an application for vacation of the award. See Arbitration Law, supra note 
13, art. 58. 
20 See 2008 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 258. [hereinafter Civil 
Procedure Law]. 
21 See New York Convention, art. 5. 
22 Brown & Rogers, supra note 2, at 329, 339.  
23 See Foreign-related Arbitration Identified as Key Priority of Arbitration Services, CIETAC, 
http://www.cietac.org/index/news/4772c81b4d672a7f001.cms (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
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III. THE NEW CRIMINAL PROVISION OF ARBITRATION BY “PERVERSION 
OF LAW” 
On June 29, 2006, China’s legislature, the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress adopted and promulgated at its 22nd meeting 
an important piece of law: The Amendments to the Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (VI). The enactment imposed criminal 
liability on the biased arbitrators by the recognition of a new crime: 
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law,” which falls within the scope of 
Dereliction of Duties of Judicial Personnel.  
A. Background of the New “Perversion of Law” Criminal Provision 
In order to guarantee the legitimacy of the arbitration process, the 
arbitral institution must ensure the neutrality of the arbitrator.24 Thus, 
having a neutral and impartial arbitrator resolve commercial disputes 
seems a fundamental goal in modern arbitration. In response to this, 
states throughout the world enact laws to deal with the corruption in 
arbitration. Surprisingly, Chinese legal policy pertaining to the partiality 
of arbitration differs from those of western nations. Apart from vacatur 
and refusal of implementation of an arbitral award, which may look 
familiar to westerners, a recent provision in China’s criminal law 
establishes criminal liability of biased arbitrators.  
Chinese Arbitration Law, unlike its western counterparts, is 
extremely young due to a limited history of arbitration in China. 
Arbitration in China began in the 1980s under a policy of instituted 
reform and openness to meet the needs of China’s rapid growing 
economy. Being an import from the west, it is new to most Chinese 
people. The purported legislative purpose of the new enactment is to 
regulate arbitrators’ conducts and guarantee fairness and justice in the 
course of arbitration, which was once considered a legal loophole.25 The 
new crime is inserted after Article 399 of Criminal Law, which falls 
within the category of crimes of dereliction of duty and is named Civil 
and Administrative Judgment by “Perversion of Law.” The Criminal 
Law became effective in 1997 while the new crime was proclaimed in 
2006. Now that a judge could face a criminal penalty for a malevolent 
ruling since enactment of the original criminal law nine years ago, why 
should an arbitrator escape from a similar punishment? As arbitration 
competes with litigation for status, some contend that an arbitrator 
should be as liable as a judge is when bending the law.  
In debating the bill that would later become the law, many arbitration 
scholars openly objected to the inclusion of the new crime. They did so 
because the arbitrator’s criminal liability is not in line with international 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
24 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 92 (R.I. 1991). 
25 See Zhongqian Chen, Lun Wangfa Zhongcai Zui De Sheli Dangum [To Delay Setting up the 
Crime of Distorting the Law to Arbitrate], 1 ZHONGCAI YANJIU [ARBITRATION STUDY] 2 (2006).  
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practices. Nevertheless, it has been adopted and has become a new law. 
Admittedly, it was the fear that the power of arbitrators could be 
mishandled and justice could be threatened that prevailed over the 
objections to the new crime and eventually formed a sound basis for the 
new provision, because this worry is prominent particularly in the 
context of China. 
Unlike Western tradition of “rule of law,” China has a unique culture 
often termed “rule of relationship (guanxi),” which is a sort of gift 
economy that involves the “cultivation of personal networks of mutual 
dependence and trust.”26 The “rule of guanxi,” also operative in Asian 
societies, appears to make it challenging for parties to find a mutually 
accepted “fair” arbitrator, and even the selection of an arbitral institution 
problematic, because parties distrust each other. The question whether 
the other party has “guanxi” with arbitrators highlights the significance 
of the impartiality of the arbitrators deciding their disputes. This problem 
is disconcerting, because it might lead to a cooling in commerce between 
China and foreign nations and there might be fewer international 
arbitration cases occurring. That is not the outcome that China would 
presently like to encourage. Understandably, a more severe punishment 
would be called for on a biased arbitrator.27 
One unavoidable and significant consequence of the new provision 
worth noting is the early intervention of the public power with 
arbitration. Generally, there is a division of criminal cases in Chinese 
criminal justice system based on the burden of proof, namely, cases of 
public prosecution and private prosecution. The public prosecutors, also 
known as a judicial authority like courts, are named Procuratorate and 
obligated to prove before the court in the former cases whereas the 
claimant himself should provide evidence of the wrongdoing of the 
accused in the latter cases. Most of the crimes are public prosecution 
cases and only a small number of them are private prosecution ones.28 
However, a crime of dereliction of duty is a public prosecution case. In 
other words, it is the Procuratorate instead of the claimant who should 
bear the burden of proof. They should investigate and collect evidence 
before bringing the case to the court. In such a case, not only the courts 
but also the Procuratorate have been indirectly warranted the power of 
substantial review of arbitral awards by the new enactment. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26 Carol A.G. Jones, Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of 
Legal Change in China, 3 SOC. AND LEGAL STUD. 195, 197 (1994). 
27 See Guoqiang Luo, Wangfa Shongcai Zui Sibian [Crime of Misuse of Law in Adjudication], 1 
ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA Zazhi [CRIMINAL SCIENCE] 71 (2009). 
28  Cases of private prosecution include the following: (1) cases to be handled only upon 
complaint; (2) cases for which the victims have evidence to prove that those are minor criminal 
cases; and (3) cases for which the victims have evidence to prove that the defendants should be 
investigated for criminal responsibility according to law because their acts have infringed upon the 
victims personal or property rights, whereas, the public security organs or the People’s Procuratorate 
do not investigate the criminal responsibility of the accused. See 1997 Criminal Procedure Law of 
the People's Republic of China, art. 170.  
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B. The Debate Surrounding the New Provision 
1. The Anti-crime Arguments 
Article XX of Amendment (VI) provides that an article be inserted 
after Article 39929 of the Criminal Law as Article 399 (I): 
 
Where anyone who undertakes the duties of arbitration 
according to law intentionally goes against the facts and 
law and makes any wrongful ruling in the process of 
arbitration, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years or detention. 
If the circumstances are extremely serious, he shall be 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 
three years but not more than seven years. 
 
This simple paragraph raises a host of complicated questions, and 
has incurred a lasting national debate. 
 Prior to the legislation, the issue of penal punishment upon a 
biased arbitrator has been at the heart of the discussion and has received 
a wide range of practical and academic attention. While the new crime 
was an effort to fill the legal gap of liability for arbitrators, many 
arbitration scholars have denounced that it seems to have fallen short of 
its goal.30 The anti-crime arguments are mainly as follows: 
 First, one of the continuing debates is whether contract traits, 
rather than judicature characteristics, form the cornerstone of, and 
exercise pervading influence over, arbitration. It has been criticized that 
the analogy of arbitration with litigation may be arbitrary and seems to 
have an impressionistic flavor.31 A common objection to the new crime 
is that it is against arbitration’s nature. It is important to understand that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
29  Article 399 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingfa) provides that judicial personnel who act with partiality and defeat the ends of 
justice and bend the law for the benefit of relatives or friends, subjecting to prosecution persons they 
clearly know to be innocent or intentionally protecting from prosecution persons they clearly know 
to be guilty, or, intentionally go against facts and laws in criminal trials to render judgments that 
misuse the law, shall be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment or 
criminal detention, and when the circumstances are serious, “not less than five years and not more 
than 10 years” of fixed-term imprisonment; and in exceptionally serious circumstances, not less than 
10 years of fixed-term imprisonment. Whoever intentionally goes against facts and laws in civil and 
administrative trials to render judgments that misuse the law, and when the circumstances are 
serious, shall be sentenced to “not more than five years” of fixed-term imprisonment; and, in 
exceptionally serious circumstances, “not less than five years and not more than 10 years” of fixed-
term imprisonment. Judicial personnel who take bribes, bend the law, and commit the crimes 
mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, and meanwhile constituting the crimes mentioned in 
Article 385 of this law, shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the stipulations for a 
heavier penalty. See 1997 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 399.  
30 See Xiaohong Liu, Queding Zhongcaiyan Zeren Zhidu De Fail Sikao [Jurisprudence Analysis 
of Establishment of Arbitrators’ Liability], 54 HUADONG ZHNGFA DAXUE XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF 
EAST CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW] 89 (2007). 
31 See Zhongqian Chen, Lun Wangfa Zhongcai Zui De Redning [Cognizance of Law-bending 
Judgment Crime], 24 ZHONGCAI YANJIU [ARBITRATION STUDY] 76 (2011). 
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arbitration is not litigation with another name. An arbitrator performs a 
task that resembles that of a judge, yet there are critical differences 
between judges and arbitrators. The latter charge fees from parties, 
whereas the former, as state personnel, receive wages from state budget. 
Further, arbitrators are experts chosen from the same industry in most 
cases and sometimes are not required to possess any legal education.32 
Rooted within market economics, disputants have chosen arbitration to 
settle controversies for hundreds of years. As such, it is the participants 
who shape the arbitration, which is then recognized by a state’s legal 
system among various private dispute resolutions.33 The rationale behind 
arbitration is the doctrine of party autonomy. In light of this doctrine, the 
parties’ consent to address arbitral issues through arbitration should be so 
respected and enforced that neither of the parties can initiate judicial 
proceedings before the arbitration takes place. Opponents of the new law 
also argue that the judicial value system should allow no intervention of 
public power in the private domain when parties mutually agree to 
exercise their autonomy to arbitrate. Under this view, arbitrators’ 
authority comes from the authorization of parties instead of a state 
because the former have the natural right of self-regulation. Therefore, 
the nature of arbitration should first be deemed as a product of contract 
between the parties and the arbitrators other than a form of judicature, 
and then as a legal service other than judicial power.34 This is particularly 
important where one goal of international arbitration is to limit state 
influence on the dispute resolution process between and among 
international parties. Otherwise, the expected benefits of arbitration 
would be dramatically reduced.35 
 Second, and more importantly, it is not clear that the new law is 
workable. Some arbitrators show signs of bias, and others appear 
objective. It is highly likely that in practice this provision will not 
function as expected, because the language in Amendment (VI) offers 
little guidance as to what particular conduct constitutes this crime. 
Specifically, the first challenge is figuring out who is covered by the new 
law. Although the person who commits the crime is referred to as 
“anyone who undertakes the duties of arbitration according to law,” it is 
far from clear as to who might be considered “anyone.” Without 
exception, the description covers both arbitrators and any other personnel 
working in arbitration commissions, 36  which causes some practical 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
32  See Lianbin Song, Wangfa Zhongcai Zui Pipan [A Critical Analysis of the Crime of 
Deliberately Rendering an Arbitral Award in Violation of Law], 62 BEIJING ZHONGCAI 
[ARBITRATION IN BEIJING] 27 (2007). 
33 See Qianquan Xu, Wangfa Zhongcai Zui Zhi Pipan [A Criticism of Law-bending Arbitration], 
3 GUANGXI MINZU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF GUANGXI UNIVERSITY FOR NATIONALITIES] 
28 (2006). 
34 Id. 
35 See Song, supra note 32, at 36. 
36  For example, “anyone” can also refer to the chairman of an arbitration commission in 
accordance with the provision “Where the parties agree that an arbitration tribunal shall be 
composed of three arbitrators, they shall each select or entrust the chairman of the arbitration 
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difficulties. An arbitral award is often made based on majority opinions 
of arbitrators and dissenters need not sign on the award.37 Should an 
arbitrator who disagrees and refuses to sign the award be included as 
“anyone” if later the crime of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” is 
found? If he were the “anyone,” would that be fair?38  
Moreover, with regard to defining “intentionally,” yet,” which is 
another fundamental question, neither Amendment (VI) itself nor the 
arbitration law provides detailed rules about how it should be 
ascertained. By including “intentionally,” a “negligent” act may be 
precluded from prosecution. But it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
draw a line between an arbitrator’s “intentional” disregard of law and a 
“negligent” mistake in the process of handling a case, because the 
intentions of an arbitrator cannot be cannot easily verified by a court. In 
practice, what satisfies “intentionally” is subject to interpretation.39  
Further, currently there is confusion about the expression “goes 
against the facts and law.” At first blush, it indicates that where both the 
two conditions of “goes against the facts” and “goes against the law” are 
satisfied, the said crime exists. However, the new enactment keeps silent 
when only one condition is fulfilled. As previously shown, both CIETAC 
and a domestic Arbitration Commission have jurisdiction over 
international or foreign-related disputes. Following international practice, 
parties could often choose what law they want to govern interpretation 
and enforcement of their agreement. Sometimes, in amicable arbitration 
or ad hoc arbitration, no applicable law is selected and arbitrators are 
empowered to disregard the strictures of legal rules in search of more 
equitable resolutions to disputes.40 Therefore, to what specific law does it 
refer? Suppose that the applicable law is a foreign law; do Chinese courts 
have the competent jurisdiction to make a decision that the arbitral award 
“goes against” a foreign law?41 Additionally, more confusion in respect 
to the phrase “if the circumstances are extremely serious” would arise 
because of its inherent ambiguity. The new enactment has been silent on 
this crucial and controversial area. As such, it is extremely difficult to 
use the mere provision in making a judgment as to the “circumstances” 
that are “extremely serious.”42  
Another problem with the new law is that it is inconsistent with 
existing Chinese law, as well as international obligations. As previously 
outlined, China adopted a “two-track” approach in judicial review of 
arbitral awards, under which Chinese judicial organs are not permitted to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
commission to appoint one arbitrator. The parties shall jointly select or entrust the chairman of the 
arbitration commission to appoint the third arbitrator, who shall be the principal arbitrator.” See 
1995 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 31. 
37 Arbitration, art. 53 to 54. 
38 See Chen, supra note 31, at 78. 
39 See Song, supra note 32, at 29. 
40 Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for 
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 351, 352 (2002). 
41 Song, supra note 32, at 27. 
42 Id. 
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review any of the legal merits or reasoning except procedural issues in 
international arbitration. However, how can a court bring in a verdict of 
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” without substantial judicial review of 
the arbitral award?43 Unfortunately, to judge if the crime exists, courts 
have to require the arbitration panel to provide reasons justifying its 
decision, despite the fact that arbitral awards are often rendered without 
explanation of reasons and even without a complete record of 
proceedings.44 Furthermore, as a domestic Arbitration Commission now 
has jurisdiction over both domestic and foreign-related disputes, suppose 
that an arbitrator of a domestic Arbitration Commission handles a 
domestic case and a foreign-related case in the same manner. He then has 
to face two different criterion of judicial review. What he might be held 
criminally liable for under domestic criteria would be immune to penal 
punishment under international criteria.45 This, in turn, makes judicial 
review act as a deterrent only to domestic arbitrators. Accordingly, a 
responsible and capable arbitrator would be overly cautious and 
understandably reluctant to risk accepting appointment. As such, the 
quality of arbitration may decline and eventually harm the development 
of arbitration as well as the efforts of rule of law in China.  
Lastly, Amendment (VI) has also been criticized as both under-
inclusive and over-inclusive. On the one hand, although the language of 
the amendment is too vague and simplistic to provide any concrete 
guidelines in practice, there is only a theoretical possibility that a biased 
arbitrator would be caught and convicted of the crime. After all, 
corruption occurs in more subtle ways and open partiality is very rare. 
The new law is more like a moral announcement or a law in paper than a 
mature legal provision.46 On the other hand, it has been opined that there 
are already enough rules to prevent arbitrator misconduct. The existing 
remedies include application for withdrawal and replacement of an 
arbitrator, application for vacation of the award, denial of enforcement of 
the award, notification of re-arbitrating by the tribunal, and rejection of 
the application.47 And even penal punishment could sometimes be used.48 
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43 See Hui Huang, Lun Wangfa Zhongcai Zui Zhi “Wangfa” Xing [The “Perverting” Nature of 
Law-bending Arbitration], 169 SICHUAN DAXUE XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF SICHUAN UNIVERSITY] 124 
(2010). 
44 A written arbitral award shall specify the arbitration claim, the facts of the dispute, the 
grounds for the award, the result of the award, the apportionment of the arbitration costs, and the 
date of the award. Where the parties agree not to specify the facts of the dispute and the grounds for 
the award in a written arbitral award, they may do so. A written arbitral award shall be signed by the 
arbitrators and affixed with the seal of the arbitration commission. Arbitrators with different 
opinions on the arbitral award may or may not sign the award. See 1995 Arbitration Law of the 
People's Republic of China, art. 54. 
45 Huang, supra note 43, at 125. 
46 Song, supra note 32, at 36. 
47 According to Arbitration Law, arbitration shall be carried out independently and free from 
interference by administrative authorities, social organizations or individuals; where an arbitrator has 
privately met a party or agent or has accepted an invitation or gift from such party or agent, he must 
withdraw and his name shall be removed from the list of arbitrators; where arbitrators demanded 
and/or accepted bribes, practiced graft or made an arbitral award that perverted the law, a party may 
submit an application for vacation of the award. See Arbitration Law, art.8, 34, 38. 58. Moreover, 
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In addition, it is worth noting that the new provision, as a distinctive 
Chinese characteristic, is not in conformity with the international trend of 
minimal judicial intervention.49 Similar provisions can hardly be found in 
most other jurisdictions.50  
 
2. The Pro-crime Arguments 
Despite such criticisms, however, many criminal academics and 
practitioners support the use of penal punishment on arbitrators. The 
Procuratorate, for example, have been strong advocates of the new law. 
They believe that no arbitrator should misuse his power to go against 
facts and laws intentionally because of the notion of basic justice, which 
is accepted universally no matter how it manifests.51 The new provision 
would encourage high standards of integrity and lasting confidence in the 
process of arbitration. The pro-crime arguments focus mainly on the 
following aspects. 
As with most legal debates, the issue of appropriateness of penalty 
could not be sensibly examined without taking account of a conduct’s 
social harm. China has long accepted this concept, giving more 
consideration to the maintenance of social stability. Though highly 
abstract, social harm is widely believed to be a core factor in devising a 
law.52 On the one hand, an arbitral award is a final law-bound decision 
equal to and maybe even more than that of a judicial decision, because it 
is not subject to any appellate review. Arbitrators are completely free to 
use their own personal knowledge in making the decision and are not 
obliged to follow rules of evidence. Further, they are not required to give 
express reasons for their decisions. On the other hand, courts are 
generally deferential to an arbitral award and will not review the legal 
merits to overturn it. While international arbitration develops as an 
alternative dispute resolution along with the fear that foreign courts will 
be biased in favor of local parties, its own impartiality cannot be 
guaranteed. Those features leave the door open to abuse of arbitral 
powers. In reality, arbitrators do have an incentive to render an unfair 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
where one or several arbitrators committed embezzlement, accepted bribes or practiced graft, or 
made an award that perverted the law, people’s courts shall rule to deny execution of the arbitral 
award. See 2008 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 258.  
48 For example, an arbitrator who accepts a bribe cannot be charged of bribery, because he is not 
state personnel, but he may be accused of non-state personnel bribery or commercial bribery. See 
1997 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 163. 
49 See Huang, supra note 43, at 123. 
50 One similar crime is in 1935 “Criminal Law of Republic of China” (Taiwan), Article 124 
stipulating the crime “Decision by Perversion of Law.”. However, to date, no case has occurred. 
Some commentators aggressively contend that this fact, however, proves that arbitrator misconduct 
is a severe social problem only in drafters’ imagination. See Huang, supra note 43, at 126. 
51 Yonghong Han, Guanya Wangfa Zhongcai Zhi Sikao: Jiyu Xianshi De Shijiao [Reflection on 
Criminal Liability of Arbitrators: A Realistic Perspective], 26 HANNAN DAXUE XUEBAO RENWEN 
SHEHUI KEXUE BAN [HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES JOURNAL OF HAINAM UNIVERSITY] 145 
(2008). 
52 See Siyang Xia, Wandfa Zhongcai Gaibugai Shou Xingfa Tiaosheng [Is the Crime Arbitration 
by Perversion of Law Appropriate], JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORIAL DAILY], Jan. 23, 2006, at A6. 
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award because of the inherently self-interested nature of their decisions. 
In that case, the partiality in arbitration could result in actual injury to the 
complaining party and social justice would then be greatly harmed. By 
stipulating the new crime, the law establishes what might be a credible 
penalty regime imposed on a biased arbitrator, even though the cases 
involving such conduct are relatively rare. It should be kept in mind that 
“no crime without law making it so; no penalty without law making it 
so” is a generally accepted principle of criminal law in most 
jurisdictions.53 In response to the attack of redundancy of crimes, it is a 
normal phenomenon that various crimes might compete and overlap. 
However, that fact alone does not justify that there is no need for the new 
crime.54  
Another powerful counterargument is that besides the feature of 
contract, arbitration also has another very important trait—quasi-
judicature—that helps make arbitration an attractive alternative to 
litigation. This is best illustrated by the enforceability of an arbitral 
award. Notably, it is an indisputable fact that arbitration resembles 
litigation and remains intimately dependent on a national legal system. 
Arbitrators are expected to act like judges who will provide justice to all 
parties and guarantee them a fair hearing and a just award. More 
importantly, arbitral awards, like judgments, are expected to be enforced 
by national courts.55  Thus, arbitration cannot be viewed merely as a 
contract of legal services. Rather, it might be viewed as a power to make 
a decision, which is indeed a part of an authority of judicature.56 Even if 
parties’ intent to arbitrate should be respected in accordance with the 
doctrine of party autonomy, it does not mean the arbitrator’s freedom to 
bend the law should be respected too.57 While an arbitrator is a private 
judge, a “judge” means that he is empowered to make a decision in 
accordance with the law instead of going against the law. Undoubtedly, 
parties’ do not consent to select a biased arbitrator and accept an arbitral 
ruling by “perversion of law.”58  
Next, even after acknowledging that the new provision is far from 
developed, especially in its workability, the solution of simply 
abrogating the new provision because of these shortcomings still appears 
insensible. Lack of clarity should not be used as an excuse to deny the 
necessity of the new provision.59 This concern could be better met by 
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53 See Luo, supra note 27, at 65. 
54 Id. 
55 Li Xu, Wangfa Zhongcai Zui De Lifa Zhengdangxing Tantao [Research about its Legislative 
Righteousness of Crime of Misuse of Law in Adjudication], 5 FAXUE ZAZHI [LAW SCIENCE 
MAGAZINE] 86 (2009). 
56 See Xia, supra note 52, at A6. 
57 Xu, supra note 55, at 86. 
58 Id. 
59 See Bingzhao Xuan, Wangfa Zhongcai De Ruzui Zhengdangxing Fenxi [The Analysis of the 
Legitimacy of Arbitration by “Pervasion of Law”], in Hexie Shehui De Xingfa Xianshi Wenti [THE 
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL LAW IN A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY] 1759 (Jie Li et al. eds., 
Publishing House of Chinese People’s Public Security University 2007).  
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providing detailed rules to make it more workable rather than 
abandoning the law. Additionally, with the help of judicial interpretation, 
it could be more feasible and function more efficiently. Even assuming a 
skeptical attitude towards the workability, it is reasonable to make an 
exception and argue that the new provision will take an active role in 
response to corruption in arbitration. Having established this law, the 
court then could proceed to articulate an arbitrator’s liability in case of 
his “perversion of law.” This change is a necessary step to improve the 
appearance of partiality. Along with other legislation, the new enactment 
has greatly enhanced China’s arbitration legal framework. 60  Frankly, 
most crimes in Chinese criminal law are virtually non-enforceable 
without further detailed rules.61     
While it has been attacked for being contrary to international 
practice, some contend that with decreasing the possibility of arbitral 
power misuse, arbitration would benefit from the more severe 
punishment. Additionally, it would ensure the healthy development of 
arbitration and make China an attractive place for international 
arbitration. 62  Furthermore, the new provision is desirable because it 
meets the present stage of economic development of China.63 Due to 
underdevelopment of market economics and lack of the tradition of rule 
of law, some Asian countries and districts like Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan, have undergone a period characterized by more intervention of 
mandatory laws with many aspects of social lives. A better development 
of arbitration in those regions appears to be achieved through the support 
of public power. They do not have to wait hundreds of years to 
“naturally” raise the professional quality of arbitrators, establish a code 
of arbitrator ethics, cultivate social trust in arbitration and repeat the 
same mistakes and then correct them.64 In consideration of the social and 
cultural similarity, it is also inadequate for China, currently, to follow the 
same route of regulating arbitrator conduct as the west. The development 
of arbitration can be promoted by the means of legislation, with 
advantages from both common law and civil law systems being fully 
used.65  
Additionally, qualification of arbitrators is a key factor in 
introducing the new law. Building a highly qualified team of arbitrators 
is extremely difficult, given the short history of China’s market 
economy. Unlike judges, arbitrators are not required to obtain any legal 
training or pass any professional examinations before performing their 
duties. Arbitral awards are sometimes rendered in favor of the party with 
guanxi. However, it is certain that the situation would be much worse if 
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60 Luo, supra note 27, at 64. 
61 Xu, supra note 55, at 87. 
62 See Xuan, supra note 59, at 1758. 
63 Id. 
64 See Luo, supra note 27, at 71.  
65 Id. at 72. 
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there were not such a strict stipulation pertaining to the impartiality of 
arbitrators.66  
Finally, the fact that it took the legislators nine years to decide and to 
create this law illustrates the necessity of criminalizing the conduct in 
China.67 There is an increasing concern about the judicial corruption in 
China. Now that a judge who acts with bias and bends the law can 
assume penal punishment, why should a “private judge” be immune from 
the same punishment? Since the professional judicial personnel are likely 
to bend the law, why could not similar things happen to an arbitrator? 
The new enactment embodies the principle that similar cases should be 
dealt with similarly, which serves as a good prevention of the crime.68 
C. Situating the Chinese Debate with the U.S. Experience on 
Impartiality of Arbitrators  
In sharp contrast to the current Chinese approach, which has minimal 
provisions concerning arbitrator neutrality but a sharply punitive criminal 
statute if there is bias “by perversion of law,” the U.S. approach has been 
quite different. The analysis of arbitral impartiality in the U.S. relies on 
analogy to judicial impartiality. Arbitrators in America are viewed in the 
same light as judges and therefore must be held to the same standards of 
impartiality as are imposed on judges.69 Additionally, a judge does not 
have to assume civil or criminal liability for his wrong ruling in 
litigation, and 70 neither does an arbitrator. Instead, the usual remedies 
for unfairness on the part of an arbitrator include removal or replacement 
of the disqualified arbitrator and vacation or impeachment of the award.  
Similarly, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that an 
arbitration award may be vacated “[w]here there [is] evident partiality or 
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.” 71  To show “evident 
partiality” in an arbitrator under the FAA, a party must either establish 
specific facts indicating actual bias toward or against a party or show that 
the arbitrator failed to disclose to the parties information that creates a 
reasonable impression of bias.72 “This rule of arbitration and this canon 
of judicial ethics rest on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law to 
try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must 
avoid even the appearance of bias.”73 Nevertheless, “arbitration differs 
from adjudication, among many other ways, because the ‘appearance of 
partiality’ ground of disqualification for judges does not apply to 
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66 Xia, supra note 52, at A6. 
67 See Xu, supra note 55, at 88. 
68 Id. 
69 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
70 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
71  9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2) (2012). See also Uniform Arbitration Act § 12(a)(2) (1956); Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act § 24(a)(2)(A), (B) (2000). 
72 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2) (2012). See Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 607 
F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2010). 
73 Commonwealth, 393 U.S at 150. 
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arbitrators; only evident partiality, not appearances or risks, spoils an 
award.”74  
The U.S. Supreme Court has established four factors to determine if 
a claimant has demonstrated evident partiality: “(1) the extent and 
character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the 
arbitrator in the proceeding, (2) the directness of the relationship between 
the arbitrator and the party he or she is alleged to favor, (3) the 
connection of that relationship to the arbitration, and (4) the proximity in 
time between the relationship and the arbitration proceeding.” When 
considering each factor, the court should determine whether the asserted 
bias is direct, definite, and capable of demonstration rather than remote, 
uncertain, or speculative, and whether the facts are sufficient to indicate 
the arbitrator’s improper motives.75 More recently, the Supreme Court 
expressed disfavor with any notion that the slightest pecuniary interest 
would constitute evident partiality76, thus suggesting that this standard is 
fairly high. 
Additionally, only neutral arbitrators are held to this standard. As 
mentioned above, many arbitral tribunals have a three-arbitrator panel. 
Under the common arrangement, each party designates one arbitrator 
(party arbitrators or non-neutral arbitrators) and the two select a third 
(neutral arbitrator). Party arbitrators are not expected to be as impartial as 
neutral arbitrators. “Evident partiality” is a ground for vacatur only for 
neutral arbitrators, because non-neutral arbitrators, unless otherwise 
agreed, serve as representatives of the parties appointing them.77 In other 
words, absent overt corruption or misconduct in the arbitration itself, no 
arbitrator appointed by a party may be challenged on the ground of his 
relationship to that party. 78  Furthermore, a party with constructive 
knowledge of the potential partiality of an arbitrator may waive its right 
to challenge an arbitration award based on evident partiality if it fails to 
object to the arbitrator’s appointment or the arbitrator’s failure to make 
disclosures until after an award is issued.79  
Vacatur of arbitration award is appropriate under FAA only in 
exceedingly narrow circumstances, such as where arbitrators are partial 
or corrupt, or where an arbitration panel manifestly disregards, rather 
than merely erroneously interprets, the law.80 An arbitration award can 
only be vacated on one of four exclusive statutory grounds: “ (1) 
corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; (2) partiality of 
an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) an overstepping of the arbitrators 
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74 Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2002). 
75 ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999). 
76 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 n.3 (1986); See In re Equimed, Inc., 2006 
WL 1865011 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (remote and trivial relationship do not exhibit required appearance of 
bias). 
77 See Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Prop., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 821–22 (8th Cir. 2001). 
78 Anderson v. Nichols, 359 S.E.2d 117 (W. Va. (1987). 
79 JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003). 
80 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 2002); Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Services, Inc., 409 
F.3d 574 (3d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2005). 
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of their authority or such imperfect execution of it that a final and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or (4) a 
failure to follow the procedure of this Arbitration Code, unless the party 
applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of 
this failure and without objection.”81 A financial interest in the outcome 
of the arbitration or a direct relationship with a party are relevant 
considerations when determining whether an arbitrator's relationship is 
material to the arbitration at issue, for purposes of determining whether 
failure to disclose a conflict of interest warrants vacatur of award under 
FAA.82  
It has been widely recognized that an arbitrator has the obligation to 
disclose to the parties any interest or bias and failing to do so might 
constitute “evident partiality”, though no specific provision pertaining to 
disclosure has been found in U.S. laws. In addition, peculiar industry 
practices and norms are considered in determining whether an arbitration 
award is subject to vacatur, particularly with an arbitrator’s full and 
timely disclosures regarding business relationships with the parties.83 
Under the evident partiality standard, arbitrators are held to a less strict 
disclosure regime than the appearance of partiality standard that applies 
to judges. 84   According to the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, an 
arbitrator has a continuing duty to disclose any fact he learns after his 
appointment if a reasonable person would consider it likely to affect the 
impartiality of the arbitrator. 85  The arbitrator also has the duty of 
disqualifying himself or herself upon discovering sufficient reasons for 
such action, in order not to prejudice an effective arbitration. This self-
disqualification of the arbitrator is required under the Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) which require any person 
appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator to disclose to the AAA any 
circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or 
personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present 
relationships with the parties or their representatives.86  
Although an arbitrator must disclose any bias or interest, arbitrators 
are not required to explain the arbitration award and their silence cannot 
be used to infer grounds for vacating an award.87 A party seeking vacatur 
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81 O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b); 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 2002); Progressive Data Systems, Inc., v. 
Jefferson Randolph Corp., 568 S.E.2d 474, 475 (2002); Metromedia Energy, Inc., v. Enserch Energy 
Services, Inc., 409 F.3d 574 (3d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. Aug. 31, 
2005). 
82 Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 64 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
83 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 648 (6th Cir. 2005). 
84 Local 814, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. J & B 
Sys. Installers & Moving, Inc., 878 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989). 
85  See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, REVISED UNIFORM 
ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (2000). 
86 See AM. BAR ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES § 
16(a) (2013). 
87 Robbins v Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682-–85 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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of an arbitration award on grounds of evident partiality has the burden of 
proof, and, to meet this burden, he or she must demonstrate that a 
reasonable person would conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the 
other party to the arbitration.88 To be specific, the party who alleges that 
an arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue 
means must: “(1) establish the fraud by clear and convincing evidence; 
(2) demonstrate that the fraud was not discoverable by the exercise of 
due diligence before or during the arbitration hearing; and (3) 
demonstrate that the fraud was materially related to an issue in the 
arbitration.”89 
Generally, the merits of the controversy between the parties to 
arbitration cannot be challenged as an attack for the allegation of evident 
partiality or corruption by the losing party. Largely for this reason, the 
merits of an award are not subject to judicial review. Courts will not 
review the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning, and may not review the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator’s award. Thus, the 
general rule is that an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors 
of fact or law. In addition, the legislature has reduced the risk to the 
parties by providing for judicial review only in circumstances involving 
serious problems with the award itself, or with the fairness of the 
arbitration process.90 
This U.S. approach works for a well-developed legal system with a 
strong rule of law model, but it is less clear that it would work well for 
China’s arbitration system. Perhaps it is because the Chinese 
understanding of corruption, fraud or misconduct is still evolving, which 
may be why the Chinese statute is ambiguous. In addition, arbitration 
awards have a stronger history of publication in the West than in China, 
which makes it more difficult to hide or disguise a distortion of law. To 
fully understand why Chinese approach of criminal statute was a rational 
choice, we need to step back and place the arbitration process in the 
context of the history of the Chinese legal system. 
Stepping Back: Exploring the “Perversion of Law” Provision in 
Light of the Historical Development of Chinese Legal System without a 
fundamental knowledge of the Chinese legal system, a plain reading of 
the provision of the new enactment may lead the reader to make a 
misconceived attempt to analogize and extrapolate from his own 
ethnocentric experiences to a quite distinct legal system. The 
contemporary Chinese legal system is still heavily burdened and 
influenced by traditional forces. This section undertakes an analysis of 
some cultural and traditional elements influencing the new crime, 
demonstrating some probable reasons for the new statute from the 
perspective of history. This author argues that a criminal law-oriented 
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88 ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999). 
89 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 682.13 (West 2013). Davenport v. Dimitrijevic, 857 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
90 Moncharsh v Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 904 (1992). 
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legal culture, a civil law tradition, and an underdevelopment of market 
economy in China contribute to the penal liability of arbitrators.  
 
1. Chinese Legal Culture 
A law must operate in a cultural context and be impacted by the 
culture, yet that culture is in turn affected by the operation of law.91 
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” has become a new crime due to 
various social and cultural elements. Chinese legal culture, which differs 
greatly from those of western countries, is at the heart of the issue. The 
basic philosophy underlying traditional Chinese law is the belief of 
harmony, which leads officials to deal with legal cases in terms of a 
“situation to be restored” rather than in terms of “individuals seeking 
justice”. Under this theory, two prominent characteristics have to be 
mentioned in China’s ancient legal system. One is that all legislation was 
criminal law, named Xing. Thus, in the eyes of ancient Chinese people, 
laws for a long period of time have just meant one thing —punishment. 
The other is that a teaching of morality called Li, which was traditionally 
considered the highest form of regulation, was used in coordination with 
Xing. Li includes a set of moral standards of conduct appropriate to 
persons of varying status in different situations. If ordinary people could 
be taught Li by precept, example and symbolic ritual, there would have 
been no need for anything like Xing, which was seen as inferior to Li. 
But, for those rebellious people who failed to make their behavior 
conform to Li, punishments had to be prescribed in the form of a code of 
penal law.  
While the codification of laws was undertaken a long time ago in 
China, there was no division of public laws and private laws in the early 
codes. In ancient China, commercial disputes were very rare. The codes 
were all public laws (criminal laws) by nature even though they were 
commonly applied in private fields. The criminal law-favored and 
morality-oriented tradition was also the mainspring of China’s ancient 
legal system and machinery of law enforcement. Of the two, the criminal 
law favor is probably the most important element because in Chinese 
history, the   “law” has long been believed to be criminal law. The 
criminal law-favored tradition embodies the need for the convenience of 
state rule at that time that results in centralization of state power. The 
more prevalent the idea of concentration of power is in a society, the 
more developed the criminal law system. 92  Where the notion of 
centralization of state power is so dominated that the state and collective 
interests surpass those of individuals, any infringement of private rights 
can be interpreted as damage to social order and state interests. Rather, 
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91 Zhongzheng Tan, Xingfa Jieru Shangshi Zhongcai De Lilun Fansi [On Theoretic Reflection of 
Intervention of Criminal Law into Commercial Arbitration (Xingfa Jieru Shangshi Zhongcai De 
Lilun Fansi),], 71 BEIJING ZHONGCAI [ARBITRATION IN BEIJING (Beijing Zhongcai)] 67 (2010). 
92 Id. at 68. 
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the state and the people will clearly express their attitude: revenge and 
punishment. This attitude best explains why the partiality of arbitrators 
becomes a social concern and why a country will eventually choose a 
criminal punishment to address it. Therefore, all the laws the society 
needs are criminal laws, or at least criminalized laws.93  
However, this changed at the dawn of the 20th century, when a legal 
reform (Legal Reform of Qing Dynasty) aimed at imitating western legal 
systems took place. This reform effectively separated the civil laws from 
criminal laws. However, it is still difficult to fill the gaps of different 
legal cultures that originated from different legal traditions. Law is 
generally thought to be a merely passive instrument whose operation can 
either be promoted or impeded by culture. Thus, the ancient Chinese 
legal tradition continues to impact the legal process in at least two 
aspects. First, lawmakers are inclined to employ criminal laws to 
maintain stability in large areas of social life. This feature, as a 
distinctive Chinese characteristic, is still strong and might remain so in 
the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, criminal provisions often contain 
more moral statements than particular legal rules. Secondly, due to a lack 
of tradition of private rule of law, the average person has less trust in 
private rights, and is accustomed to turning to intervention of public 
power for their sense of security.94  
The distinction between eastern and western legal cultures seems 
much more pronounced than the distinctions among different western 
legal cultures. The categories and functions of laws vary even more 
across cultures. Considering those diametrically opposed traditions, the 
Chinese arbitration system is within the larger framework of China’s 
national legal system and evolves along with the development of that 
system. With no western rule of law tradition on one side, and a strong 
impact of local criminal law-favored and morality-oriented tradition on 
the other side, it appears that the penal liability of arbitrators is not only 
desirable in the eyes of Chinese authority, but also welcomed by the 
people. This of course is not surprising given the ambivalent value of 
criminal law for modern China.  
2. Civil Law Tradition 
Following the Legal Reform of the Qing Dynasty, a significant 
development of modern law in China was characterized by the 
introduction of a Civil Code. This code borrowed a lot from the Japanese 
and German models and today has a direct offspring in Taiwan. It has 
only been more than a few decades since China began creating 
systematic codes. Legal ideas were directly taken from one legal system 
to another. Legislators were content with formalism and law-making. For 
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93  Zhongqiu Zhang, COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF CHINESE AND WESTERN LEGAL CULTURES 
(Zhong Xi Falv et al. eds., 2009). 
94 See Han, supra note 51, at 146. 
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this reason, it is often believed that the contemporary Chinese legal 
system is attributed to the influence of the civil law family. Traditionally, 
civil law countries were hostile to arbitration. Arbitration by “Perversion 
of Law” has to some extent, followed this tradition.  
One of the enduring characteristics of the differences between 
common and civil law system is with respect to what is law. It is well 
known that in common law countries, case law is commonly believed to 
be the main source of the law. However, in civil law countries, the law is 
statutory. The latter jurisdictions have put emphasis on legislation. 
Furthermore, people find themselves with more interest in statute making 
than dispute resolution. Thus, civil law judges are described as 
“mechanically appl[ying] legislative provisions to given fact 
situations.”95 This feature embodies the deductive method of civil law 
systems, which is distinct from the inductive method of common law. 
Some jurisdictions, such as China, even look at the deductive method 
that has become popular and introduce it into their domestic legal 
systems. Because arbitration is a significant part of the justice system on 
which Chinese society relies, it is not surprising that the legislature 
believes that it is in the public interest to establish a generally accepted 
enactment to regulate arbitration. The overconfidence in the power of 
legislation can also be a fruitful ground for an explanation of the new 
enactment in China, regardless of the significant gap between enacted 
rules (the law-in-the-books) and actual practice (the law-in-action).  
Another noteworthy aspect is the influence of judges in different 
legal systems. Civil law adjudicators should mechanically follow the law 
(statutes), rather than “create” the law. Parties in a civil law system go to 
court to resolve disputes where statutory law is not interpreted, but is 
rather applied by judges to determine the outcome of cases.96  While 
continental judges have broad managerial powers, they are expected to 
apply the law in an almost mechanical way, remaining a controlled 
instrument of the legislature.97 This system leaves no room for judges’ 
participation in the creation or transformation of legal rules. Conversely, 
in the United States it is readily acknowledged that parties seek to 
achieve changes in the law through the legal system, and that judges 
have the ability through statutory interpretation to make laws. The task of 
a common law judge is to evaluate counsel’s competing arguments about 
hyper-factual analogies and subtle distinctions in prior decisional law.98 
By following the precedents, judges can make a breakthrough to create 
new rules when necessary. They have express law-making and policy-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
95 Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal 
System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1334 (1995). 
96 Id. 
97 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE LONELINESS OF THE COMPARATIVE LAWYER---AND OTHER 
ESSAYS IN FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 184 (1999). 
98 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity 
and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 Colum. J. EUR. L. 63, 76–77 (2001). 
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creating functions.99 In addition, many civil law judges consider it an 
important part of their job to help the parties reach an amicable 
settlement. Judges in common law systems are comparatively passive in 
their fact-finding role. Notably, civil law judges do have more chances to 
engage in “perversion of law.” Without doubt, their impartiality duties do 
not and cannot be the same as those of common law judges. A common 
law judge is not accountable for his decision (even unfair decisions) and 
for any losses incurred by the parties. Likewise, neither is an arbitrator, 
who is deemed a quasi-judge. Decisions that deviate from the law would 
not be considered an inappropriate violation of impartiality obligations in 
common law system. How can a U.S. judge be charged with bending the 
law since he has the power to make the law? Therefore, crimes like 
adjudicators’ perversion of law appear to be found only in Asian 
countries with a civil law tradition.  
3. Market Economy 
Arbitration is widely believed to be an inherently private, contract-
drawer system of dispute resolution, and a product of a market economy. 
This perception is supported to some extent by the history of arbitration 
and the degree of parties’ control in shaping arbitration proceedings. 
However, it cannot be assumed that arbitration in China has the similar 
background of market economy as that in the west. China’s commercial 
environment is significantly different. Chinese arbitration lacks its 
purported popularity, custom, and ability of private governance from the 
incomplete development of market economy. While China is 
transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy, the latter is extremely young, having only been around since 
the 1990s. The underdevelopment of market economy and the socialist 
central planning-featured impact provide arbitration with less soil for 
growth. It is important to note that the development of arbitration in 
China is not due to the maturity of market economy and party autonomy, 
but instead is a result of government promotion. Although Arbitration 
Commissions are proclaimed to be administratively independent from 
both the local and national governmental units in accordance with 
Arbitration Law,100 they are far from being truly independent. Most of 
them are to some extent linked to various administrative authorities in 
that their existence depends on the manner and degree to which they are 
supported by the local Chinese governments. 101  Arbitrators are thus 
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99 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS, 16–23 (1962). 
100 Arbitration commissions shall be independent from administrative authorities and shall have 
no subordinate relationships with administrative authorities. There shall also be no subordinate 
relationships between arbitration commissions themselves. See Arbitration Law, supra note 13, art. 
14. 
101  For example, the People’s Governments of the municipalities shall arrange relevant 
departments and chambers of commerce to organize and establish arbitration commissions in a 
unified manner. See Arbitration Law, supra note 13, art. 10. 
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viewed as government officials, and the standard of arbitrator 
impartiality is naturally expected to be the same as that of judges. 
Furthermore, there is no such thing in China as a code of ethics for 
arbitrators. Therefore, regulation of arbitrators can hardly be realized 
through a code of ethics or through market rules such as competition, and 
reputation. On the contrary, it has to depend upon public power and 
criminal provisions. Moreover, the criminal provisions do not completely 
replace a code of ethics for arbitrators. Though there is a system in place 
that regulates arbitration in China, it will still take much longer to perfect 
its arbitration laws.  
IV. EVALUATIONS ON THE NEW CRIME AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
A. Evaluations on the New Crime 
Arbitration is efficient, inexpensive, and harmonious. Parties have 
long regarded international commercial arbitration as an effective choice-
of-forum and mechanism for resolving international commercial 
disputes. It provides parties with specific advantages over traditional 
litigation. Foremost, arbitration alleviates most of the jurisdictional 
disputes amongst parties. 102  However, the Chinese legislative attitude 
towards arbitration, as shown in the enactment, seems to be unfriendly to 
arbitrators, as it discourages the deference to arbitration. Arbitration is by 
its nature quasi-private and procedurally more flexible than judicial 
systems. It provides greater certainty and a higher level of expertise than 
the court-based system. This flexibility allows arbitrators to work more 
quickly and efficiently, which is very important for time-sensitive 
commercial arrangements. However, with this flexibility it is possible for 
arbitrators to betray the trust of the parties and rule against the provision 
of the law. Because arbitral awards are final, binding, and enforceable in 
the same manner as court judgments, and because wide discretion is left 
to the parties, their attorneys, and the arbitrators to fashion the procedure 
as they wish without any judicial interference, this system could cause an 
infringement of legal interests and rights. 103  Furthermore, due to the 
universal acceptance of the New York Convention, which provides for 
the confirmation of arbitration awards in member nations, parties cannot 
resolve their disputes in multiple forums if one party contests the 
decision of the arbitral tribunal.104  
From an economic perspective, the issue of quality of service is 
critical in that a common criterion of quality needs to be set out for the 
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102 See Thomas Lundmark, Verbose Contracts, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 131 (2001). 
103 See THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH & PETER H. KASKELL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS 
BEST 281–85 (2001). 
104 NEW YORK Convention ARTICLE V, on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3838, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/ny-
convention/text.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Currently, 91 nations are parties to the Convention. 
The list of nations is available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=16 (last 
visited May 13, 2014). 
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healthy development of a market. If it is lower than the standard of the 
market, and the service provider cannot be expelled, the results would be 
a decrease of quality of service and a collapse of market in the end.105 In 
terms of arbitrator impartiality, it is reasonable and fair to make a biased 
arbitrator, the provider of poor quality service, assume some liability. 
It has been recognized that arbitration rulings must be subject to 
some judicial review to ensure that the arbitral proceeding has operated 
within the state’s legal framework. This supports a conclusion that the 
judicial authority should act as a watchdog in supervising arbitrators and 
providing a remedy when necessary. Adjudicators should act for the 
common good. Regardless of which laws govern, the rule that the bias or 
partiality of an arbitrator, whom the parties expected to be neutral, is 
good cause for invalidating the arbitration award appears to be 
universally accepted.106  
To ensure impartiality, it is necessary for China to legislate on the 
serious misconduct of arbitrators. However, Chinese legislation 
addresses the concern with a more severe means than may be necessary, 
criminal liability. Clearly, the lawmakers made an inappropriate analogy 
between the role of an arbitrator and that of a judge, in which an 
arbitrator is virtually identical to a judge. They probably believe that all 
adjudicators should be neutral when making a decision and arbitrators 
should behave as impartially as judges. This belief confuses the 
distinction between arbitration and litigation. It is helpful to begin by 
noting that although the arbitrator performs a task that resembles that of a 
judge, there are critical differences between judges and arbitrators. 
Despite the resemblance between arbitration proceedings and court 
proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that the former is the result 
of a private contract while the latter arises from the state’s authority to 
resolve disputes and to compel compliance. As private actors, arbitrators 
perform their function for private gain.107 The basic role of arbitration is 
a sort of legal services, which is at essence market participants’ self-
regulating and an unofficial dispute resolution system without state 
intervention.108 It has been opined that if it had been necessary to create a 
new crime in regulating an arbitrator’s misconduct, it would be better to 
be one like fraud or infringement upon property on the basis of contract, 
rather than a crime of dereliction of duty.109 In fact, blindly transplanting 
the crime of Judicial Personnel by Perversion of Law and applying it to 
arbitrators was an ineffective method to achieve the social goals. This, 
along with the provision of establishment of arbitration commissions, is 
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105 Mingchao Fan, Crime of Misuse of Law in Adjudication under the Vision of Commercial 
Arbitration, 27 HEBEI LAW SCIENCE 126 (2009) (China). 
106 4 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 709 § 1 (1975). 
107 Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 
DUKE L.J. 1279, 1302–03 (2000). 
108 Jing Lu, On Limited Criminal Responsibility of Arbitration 24 ARB. STUDY, 82, 85 (2010) 
(China). 
109 See Huang, supra note 43, at 123. 
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difficult to make people believe that arbitration in China is truly 
independent.110 
The lawmakers also seem to think that an imperfect system is better 
than no system. However, a lack of market rules, industry regulation, and 
a code of arbitrator ethics and civil liability, makes the cure worse than 
the illness. The core issue here is not whether the biased arbitrator should 
be liable or not, but instead the issue is how and to what extent should 
the arbitrator be liable. Any change of institution, especially in the form 
of criminal law, must be prudential even though confidence in criminal 
law is one of the most rooted political faiths in China. Ensuring the 
enforcement of standards and providing meaningful remedies to those 
injured by arbitral misconduct is equally as important as articulating 
standards of conduct and professional ethics for arbitrators and provider 
institutions.111 There are some market forces that discourage arbitrator 
misconduct. Arbitrators wishing to attract business would have an 
incentive to develop a reputation of impartiality. Many are obedient to 
the law, even though there is no formal punishment and no benefit can be 
obtained from breaking the law. Arbitrators’ actions are restricted by 
custom, conscience, and such concerns like caring for one’s reputation. 
Additionally, Arbitrators’ consider the net profit by deducting the cost 
and risks of law breaking or being sympathetic to the victims. Thus, 
arbitration develops along with the market economy, and market rules 
seem to function effectively and play a more important role than legal 
rules.112  
While it appears a good objection that the criminal punishment is 
inconsistent with the international practice, it fails to further explain why 
similar crimes can rarely be found in most other jurisdictions. A criminal 
penalty results in harsh consequences to the individual, to his or her 
family, and indirectly to society as a whole. A state should avoid misuse 
of a criminal penalty or should tailor the penalty to avoid excessive, 
ineffective, or costly penalties. In a modern society, with the focus being 
moved on citizens’ rights and interests, civil laws play a more important 
role than criminal laws. Criminal laws should be cautiously applied 
because of the higher social cost. The basic idea is that the law-makers 
should make attempts to procure maximum social benefits—effective 
prevention and control of misconducts at the expense of minimum social 
pay—use of less or none of criminal penalty. Even though it is submitted 
that China should address the issue of arbitrator impartiality, it cannot 
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110 Arbitration Law provides that arbitration shall be carried out independently according to law 
and shall be free from interference by administrative authorities, social organizations or individuals. 
See Arbitration Law, art. 8; Arbitration commissions may be established in centrally-governed 
municipalities and in municipalities where provincial and autonomous regional governments are 
located…the People's Governments shall arrange relevant departments and chambers of commerce 
to organize and establish arbitration commissions in a unified manner. See Arbitration Law, supra 
note 13, art. 10. 
111  Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and 
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 458 (2004). 
112 See Chen, supra note 25, at 3. 
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put this inclination to an unlimited extreme without consideration of the 
potential harms associated with the penal punishment. This ultimately 
reflects a national cognition of the nature of arbitration and the extent of 
transfer of public power to the arbitral right. Some scholars are worried 
that the new law might be easily misused which, in turn, would deter 
many foreign candidates that otherwise would have been appointed as 
arbitrators.113 It is like a double-edged sword which might harm both the 
state and the individual. With the belief that the rulers should try to avoid 
employing the criminal law as much as possible, the criminal law remedy 
can only be considered the last resort. Furthermore, the previous function 
of criminal liability discussed above could be replaced by some other 
means of social regulation such as a code of ethics and a civil liability of 
arbitrators. Unfortunately, the new Chinese civil tradition and arbitration 
experience do not yet provide a strong foundation for other non-criminal 
means of controlling arbitrator misconduct. 
With the new enactment, the task of ensuring arbitrator neutrality in 
China presents a number of possible barriers in both perception and 
reality. While a new crime has been articulated, its purported effect is 
questionable if true enforcement is unavailable as what may constitute it 
is very uncertain. On the contrary, the ambiguity of the provision will 
undoubtedly impact arbitrators’ power of discretional evaluation of 
evidence as well as offer the opportunity of misuse itself by the judicial 
authority. That might infringe the legal rights and interests of the 
arbitrator and the parties.  
B. Proposals for Reform 
The international community has been seeking a balance for years: 
on the one hand, arbitrators should be required to assume liabilities —in 
light of arbitral justice—for losses of parties incurred from their 
deliberate or negligent misconduct in arbitration; on the other hand, to 
realize the value of efficient arbitration, arbitrators should be warranted 
certain immunity when performing their duties, which is necessary for 
them to be free from improper interference and offence. How to keep the 
balance depends not only on understanding the nature of arbitration and 
the roles of arbitrators, but also of the current situation of development in 
arbitration under a number of certain social conditions, such as social 
identification of arbitration and the overall qualification of arbitrators. 
Therefore, nations may set up institutions of arbitrator liability suitable 
for their national conditions on the basis of jurisprudence for deference 
to arbitration. 
As outlined earlier, the newly established arbitrator criminal liability 
regime in China is riddled with problems. The current regime can well be 
described as a legislator-based system, characterized by paternalism and 
rigidity. It appears that impartiality of arbitration and deference to 
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arbitration are two conflicting values. This problem is particularly severe 
and disconcerting in China. The simplistic approach of the new law 
needs to be reformed because it is unable to achieve the goal of 
impartiality of arbitrators. It is reasonable to expect that detailed rules 
will emerge in the future, however, this does not suggest that China 
should wholly abandon the use of the new law. 
In discussing the reform of the regime, it is the author’s view that a 
better method for realizing the goal is through a Judicial Interpretation of 
the criminal statute. 114  Some U.S. experience has appeal and can be 
borrowed in the context of China. In general, it must be kept in mind that 
maintaining deference to arbitration is one of the most important 
principles underlying judicial review of arbitration. The goal of Judicial 
Interpretation is to design an effective mechanism to ensure fairness and 
justice in the course of arbitration and at the same time preserve 
deference to arbitration. Four aspects can be included.  
1. Private Prosecution 
In accordance with the current Chinese law, the crime of dereliction 
of duty by state personnel who exercise public power on behalf of the 
state is public prosecution. Since arbitration by “Perversion of Law” falls 
within the scope of dereliction of duty, it is the Procuratorate, not the 
claimant, who should bear the burden of proof. Whenever a “biased” 
arbitrator is charged of “go[ing] against facts and law”, the Procuratorate 
needs to examine the finding of the merits and the application of the law 
in arbitration and prove the crime before the court. The court again has to 
review issues like fact-finding and law application in determining what 
might constitute the crime. The status of the arbitrator has become 
weaker. It appears to be going farther away from the principle of 
deference to arbitration. Previously, only procedural issues rather than 
merits of international arbitration were allowed to be examined by the 
courts. But the enactment broke the limit of the legislation because it 
authorized both the courts and the Procuratorate the power of substantial 
investigation over an arbitral award—which simply means a retrial. That 
inquiry, however, is contrary to the finality of arbitration. The legislature 
has put itself and the judicial authority into a dilemma: a review of the 
merits of arbitration is in violation with China’s international convention 
obligation whereas omission of criminal liability is against China’s 
criminal law. The intervention of the public power with arbitration has 
also been expanded, and the balance has been broken.  
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114 The Judicial Interpretation in China is not a precedent based system, but involves workable 
rules enacted by the highest judicial authority, i.e., the Supreme People's Court and/or the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate, with the view to apply a particular statute. It is said coming from a practical 
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To place an important check and balance, arbitration by “Perversion 
of Law” would better be interpreted as private prosecution to shift the 
burden of proof to the party who accuses the “biased” arbitrator of the 
crime. The claimant, instead of the Procuratorate, should demonstrate the 
partiality in the process of arbitration. A similar U.S. provision is “[a] 
party seeking vacatur of an arbitration award on grounds of evident 
partiality must demonstrate that a reasonable person would have to 
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the 
arbitration.” With the restructuring of the procedure, the Procuratorate no 
longer has the power to interfere with arbitration. The intervention of 
public power with arbitration can be narrowed and the chances of misuse 
of the criminal provision can be limited. The higher the threshold, the 
more difficult the new law can be employed and the more protection 
arbitration will get. When providing the elements which need to be taken 
into account as evidences, the U.S. experience concerning the proof of 
corruption, fraud, or other undue means can also be referenced. It seems 
that arbitration could get sufficient protection while at the same time 
necessary flexibility is preserved for deterring a biased arbitrator. 
2. Criminal Liability only for the Neutral Arbitrator 
The most popular method for appointing arbitrators to an arbitral 
panel in international disputes is for each side to appoint one arbitrator, 
with a third arbitrator appointed either by the two selected arbitrators or 
by the arbitration association (or another appointing authority). 115  In 
many jurisdictions, non-neutral arbitrators have long been considered 
agents of the parties appointing them. In the United States, it is 
acceptable that non-neutral arbitrators are not expected to be impartial 
and only the neutral arbitrator is required to be “neutral”, as the term 
suggests. The most important obligation of an arbitrator’s impartiality is 
the duty to disclose information, especially the information concerning 
peculiar interest or identity, which provides the market with an early 
warning.  
A significant issue that needs to be clarified is whether the non-
neutral arbitrators assume the same penal liability as the neutral 
arbitrator. In other words, where an arbitral award is rendered on the 
basis of opinions of the majority or the neutral arbitrator, who, for 
example, goes against the facts and the law, should the non-neutral 
arbitrator or arbitrators who had different opinions be deemed as an 
accomplice of the crime? Many people believe that non-neutral 
arbitrators are just hired guns because being non-neutral makes these 
arbitrators more attractive to certain parties. What they say should have 
no more weight than the neutral arbitrator. Unfortunately, nothing in 
current Chinese law provides either a distinction in liabilities among 
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different arbitrators or a detailed working procedure of the new crime 
concerning the disclosure duty.  
It is improper to enact a statute without regard to the specific context 
in which it is used. To ensure smoother transition and structural 
adjustment, this author argues that attention should be paid to the 
distinction of arbitrators in the panel, as they have different incentives in 
arbitral proceedings. Exploration of incentives that make the arbitrator 
free from partiality and exercise good faith and due diligence contributes 
to our understanding of the roles of panel members in commercial 
arbitration. There seems to be no good reason why all arbitrators should 
be required to be identically impartial since they have varied ways of 
appointment. Notably, some flexibility is necessary. A clarification 
should be made in the future Judicial Interpretation that only the neutral 
arbitrator should be criminally liable for arbitration by “Perversion of 
Law.” This seemingly would have a positive impact, especially when 
China is in a critical stage of encouraging the development of arbitration. 
3. Civil Liability 
It is presumed that parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to 
bear the risk of the arbitrator’s mistake in return for a quick, inexpensive, 
and conclusive resolution to their dispute. The popularity of commercial 
arbitration is that it brings the value of benefit and impartiality together. 
As discussed earlier, arbitration historically has been a dispute resolution 
mechanism for transactions that only implicate private law. 116  The 
relationship between arbitrators and parties is more like a contract, and 
an arbitrator should undertake the liability of breach of contract where he 
acts partially. Consequently, arbitrator civil liability can be introduced 
into the Chinese arbitration legal regime. This remedy cannot properly be 
viewed as a white elephant from the uncertainties of the system, but as a 
buffer.  
4. Detailed Definitions 
Without detailed rules, the criminal provision is of little practical 
value. Besides what has been mentioned earlier, there are still many 
vague terms which need to be carefully defined. In order to decide 
whether the arbitrator has perverted the law or not, where an arbitral 
award is rendered through mediation, neither a written mediation 
statement nor a written arbitral award can be in compliance with the facts 
and law.117 Suppose the law is not domestic law, the judicial authority 
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116 See Christine L. Davitz, Note, U.S. Supreme Court Subordinates Enforcement of Regulatory 
Statutes to Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: From the Bremen's License to the Sky Reefer's 
Edict, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 62-63 (1997). 
117An arbitration tribunal may mediate before giving an award. An arbitration tribunal shall 
mediate where both parties voluntarily seek mediation. Where mediation is unsuccessful, an award 
shall be made in a timely manner. Where mediation leads to an agreement, the arbitration tribunal 
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has to prove first of all what the foreign law is and what its content and 
legislative purposes are. Proof of foreign law is so complicated because 
of different languages, understanding of laws, and notions of legislation. 
More importantly, any decision concerning the interpretation of foreign 
law by a Chinese court might constitute an infringement of foreign 
sovereignty in violation of the basic principle of international law 
because the foreign law is enacted and should only be interpreted by a 
foreign authority. Chinese judicial organs’ inherited way of thinking in 
terms of domestic law might bring about real “verdict by perversion of 
law.” Furthermore, an arbitrator is criminally liable only when his or her 
conduct is “intentional.” But what if the arbitrator’s liability of 
“negligence” resulted from lack of professional care and due diligence? 
In addition, the relation between the crime and the effectiveness of a 
foreign arbitral award has not been provided. It is likely to have a 
ridiculous concurrence that a foreign award which is rendered oversea by 
a Chinese arbitrator has been recognized and enforced by a Chinese court 
whereas the arbitrator is found guilty of this crime in China.  
By carefully defining the conditions of the crime by listing some 
specific situations, the future Judicial Interpretation can help make the 
enactment more workable. The more detailed it is, the more authority the 
enactment has. Taking into account the relationship between the spirit of 
arbitration and the purpose of legislation in practice, the judicial 
authority may start from the stance of deference to the contract nature of 
arbitration and make some appropriate adjustments when interpreting the 
law. For instance, the crime can be more restricted to domestic 
arbitration than foreign and foreign-related arbitration; the “law” should 
not include foreign law, because the criminal law is a public law and 
should be strictly limited to a particular territory. Also, the nature of 
arbitration requires more discretion than litigation, and the criterion of an 
arbitrator’s “perversion of law” should be inferior to those of a judge, 118 
so long as the award does not go against the fundamental principles of 
civil and commercial law, such as party autonomy, good faith and public 
policy, substantially, as well as equal hearing and admission of evidence 
procedurally. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the first five years, there have been no published instances in 
which an arbitrator has been convicted under this provision. Records of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
shall prepare a written mediation statement or a written arbitral award on the basis of the result of the 
agreement. Written mediation statements and arbitral awards shall have equal legal effect. See 
Arbitration Law, supra note 13, art. 51. 
118 In accordance with Arbitration Law, disputes shall be resolved through arbitration on the 
basis of the facts, in compliance with the law and in an equitable and reasonable manner. While 
Civil Procedure Law provides that in trying civil cases, a people's court must take the facts as the 
basis and the law as the standard. Obviously, the requirement of “in compliance with the law” is 
inferior to that of “the law as the standard.” See Arbitration Law, supra note 13, art. 7; see also Civil 
Procedure Law, supra note 20, art. 7.  
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prosecutions and convictions, however, are not public in China, so it is 
difficult to confirm whether cases have, in fact, been brought. On the one 
hand, the possibility of criminal conviction would presumably deter 
biased arbitrators. While that is a net social good, there is another risk. 
Prosecutorial abuse of the statute, by threatening to bring criminal 
prosecution unless the arbitrator rules a certain way, could be a threat to 
the independence of the arbitration process. The proponents of the new 
provision argue that the justice of arbitration and protection of the rights 
and interests of parties can be achieved in practice through the regulation 
of arbitration with state interference, whereas its opponents are against 
public intervention and believe that the previous goals can only be 
realized through the development of arbitration itself.  
The debate over the crime remains largely inconclusive, and so will 
continue into the foreseeable future, as will the relevant empirical 
studies. To create a better balance between arbitrator impartiality and 
deference to arbitration, practice should have the final say on the effect 
of the new provision. This, by its nature, reflects the different attitude 
towards arbitration. The diversity of culture, tradition and condition 
among different nations plays a very important role in the distinction of 
policy adoption and law making in each nation. A dissimilar institution is 
not simply a deviation from international practice. It also manifests a 
diverse need at different stages of social development. Nations may take 
specific measures in conformity with their own context to support 
arbitration, so long as those measures, being deferential to an arbitral 
award, are applied for the independence and protection of legal rights of 
parties.  
 
